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WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 
Michael Munro 
 
 
h  WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 
§ THE PLACE OF THE QUESTION: NOTE ON THE DEFI-
NITION OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
What is philosophy? That’s a good question—
not because there’s no answer, but because 
what’s involved in posing it points up some-
thing essential to philosophy. 
 In the Treatise on the Emendation of the 
Intellect, Spinoza sets out what’s required by a 
definition. A circle, a typical definition might 
run, is a figure in which all lines drawn from the 
center to the circumference are equal. The 
problem with this definition, what makes it 
merely verbal, is that it defines a circle by way 
of one of its properties, not by way of its 
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essence. Definition, for Spinoza, gets at the 
essence (from which all properties follow): A 
complete definition demonstrates how what it 
defines comes about. The definition of a circle 
as a figure that is described by any line of which 
one end is fixed and the other movable, as one 
commentator has pointed out, “literally gene-
rates the circle by providing a procedure where-
by we ‘make’ the thing to be defined.”1 
 Philosophy is defined by what takes place in 
the question of philosophy itself. What Auden 
said of poetry could also be said of philosophy: 
it makes nothing happen. Nothing happens, or 
nothing happens—and in the space of the same 
few words both can. Philosophy operates that 
displacement and is defined by it: “what is phil-
osophy?” become “what is philosophy?”—the 
question persists, but everything has changed. 
§ WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? GLOSS OF A SENTENCE OF
GIORGIO AGAMBEN’S 
“In its deepest intention, philosophy is a firm 
assertion of potentiality, the construction of an 
experience of the possible as such.” 
in its deepest intention 
Philosophy, it is said, begins in wonder. Wonder, 
1 Bibliographic references for all citations can be found 
under “Notes” at the back of the book, keyed to page 
numbers in the main body of this essay. 
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however, is both a noun and a verb. Noun: “A 
feeling of surprise mingled with admiration, 
caused by something beautiful, unexpected, un-
familiar, or inexplicable.” Verb: “The desire, or 
curiosity, to know something.” 
 
philosophy is 
 
In that light, philosophy is not so much—or not 
simply—‘the love of wisdom,’ but instead 
marks the passage from wonder as a noun to 
wonder as a verb. Philosophy is the love of 
wisdom to the extent that it remains an incite-
ment to it. 
 
a firm assertion 
 
To philosophize has often been to argue. 
‘Argument’ comes from the Latin arguere, to 
make clear. To argue might then be said to 
mean to give an idea of, to clarify. In the very 
divergence of the arguments used and the 
positions held, what argument and the recourse 
to it in philosophy testify to before all else—
what they clarify—is, precisely, the nature of 
the possible. 
 
of potentiality 
 
Potentiality and possibility alike concern ability 
or capacity: what may be. ‘A firm assertion of 
potentiality,’ is, in the first place, an affirma-
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tion of the importance of what may be to what 
is. What is is not what it is without what it may 
be, or may have been. Likewise, and after its 
own fashion, what may be is. Wonder enters the 
picture between potentiality and actuality, and 
philosophy affirms their articulation: Surprised 
admiration at what is gives place to what had 
not yet existed, the desire to know it. 
the construction of 
To construct is a transitive verb, which means 
that to construct is always to construct some-
thing. It is to take something that is given and 
to make of it something that was not, some-
thing it was not, something else. It is to take 
something as it is for something it may be. 
an experience 
Experience shares the same root as experiment. 
of the possible as such 
Neither this nor that possibility, but possibility 
in general, what makes the possible what it is: 
What there is not, yet, beyond the desire, its 
experience: what it might be to know. 
§ PHILOSOPHY: A LIFE . . .
There is a tradition according to which philo-
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sophy is known as ‘the art of living.’ That 
definition of philosophy only finds its true 
sense, however, and not coincidentally, in light 
of a definition of potentiality first elaborated at 
philosophy’s outset. 
 As Giorgio Agamben recounts, Aristotle 
opposes his definition of potentiality to that of 
the Megarians. Whereas the Megarians hold 
that in a given act all potentiality passes into 
actuality, so that nothing is left over in this 
passage and potentiality has no independent 
existence as such, Aristotle holds that poten-
tiality is distinct from actuality and exists on a 
par with it. At issue between Aristotle and the 
Megarians is the example of the kithara player. 
The problem with the Megarians’ position, for 
Aristotle, is that it fails to distinguish someone 
who can play the kithara from someone who 
cannot: on their account it is impossible to say 
why when one person picks up a kithara she can 
make music with it while another person 
cannot. If all potentiality passes immediately 
and without remainder into actuality, there’s 
simply music or there’s not. 
 That consideration leads Aristotle to make 
what at first glance appears to be a counter-
intuitive observation: The difference between 
someone who can play the kithara and someone 
who cannot is that the kithara player is capable 
of not playing the kithara. The real difference 
between the two takes place, paradoxically, 
away from the instrument. The kithara player 
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can be said to be capable of not playing the 
kithara in a way that it would not make sense to 
say of someone who is simply incapable of 
playing it: for the latter, away from the kithara, 
entertains no relation to it and, to him or her, 
that absence is a matter of indifference. What is 
essential to the kithara player’s potential to 
play the kithara, and what for Aristotle is 
essential to potentiality more generally, is that 
what he calls the impotential to do, or be, 
something is what remains of potentiality that 
never passes into actuality and serves to 
distinguish the former from the latter. 
 In any given instance to be capable of an 
impotentiality is therefore to be able to be 
affected by the absence, following cessation, of 
the activity in question. It is to be one to whom 
that absence makes a difference. 
 Philosophy is the art of living in that to be a 
philosopher is to first be capable of the non-
philosophical life. To be a philosopher is to feel 
the absence of the philosophical life bear on 
one’s own. 
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h  ON ARGUMENT 
 
§ PREFACE: NOTE TOWARD AN ART OF IGNORANCE 
 
It is very difficult to say why one becomes attached to a 
particular problem. 
~Gilles Deleuze 
 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge opens Chapter 12 of 
the Biographia Literaria with curious resolve. “In 
the perusal of philosophical works I have been 
greatly benefited by a resolve, which, in the 
antithetic form and with the allowed 
quaintness of an adage or maxim, I have been 
accustomed to word thus: ‘until you understand a 
writer’s ignorance, presume yourself ignorant of his 
understanding.’” What is the relationship posed 
here between ignorance and understanding? 
 In Memoirs of the Blind, Jacques Derrida 
discusses the conditions and status of self-
portraiture. According to Derrida, “the status of 
the self-portrait of the self-portraitist will 
always retain a hypothetical character.” “Even if 
one were sure,” for example, “that Fantin-
Latour were drawing himself drawing, one 
would never know, observing the work alone, 
whether he were showing himself drawing him-
self or something else—or even himself as some-
thing else, as other. And he can always, in 
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addition, draw this situation: the stealing away 
of what regards you, of what looks at you, of 
what fixedly observes you not seeing that with 
which or with whom you are dealing.” None of 
that can be known for a very general reason: In 
the instant pen or pencil makes contact with 
paper, “the inscription of the inscribable is not 
seen.” Further, 
Whether it be improvised or not, the 
invention of the trait [trait, feature, line, 
stroke, mark] does not follow, it does not 
conform to what is presently visible […] 
Even if drawing is, as they say, mimetic, 
that is, reproductive, figurative, repre-
sentative, even if the model is presently 
facing the artist, the trait must proceed 
in the night. It escapes the field of vision. 
Not only because it is not yet visible, but 
because it does not belong to the realm of 
the spectacle, of spectacular objectivity—
and so that which it makes happen or 
come [advenir] cannot in itself be mime-
tic. […] Whether one underscores this 
with the words of Plato or Merleau-
Ponty, the visibility of the visible cannot, 
by definition, be seen, no more than 
what Aristotle speaks of as the diapha-
nousness of light can be. My hypothe-
sis—remember that we are still within 
the logic of the hypothesis—is that the 
draftsman always sees himself to be prey 
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to that which is each time universal and 
singular and would have to be called the 
unbeseen, as one speaks of the unbe-
knownst.  
 
In order to be read—in order to be worth 
having read—above all one must unknowingly 
have preserved for another an ignorance to be 
understood. One can perhaps paraphrase Ben-
jamin here and speak of an historical index 
proper to ignorance, that it only attains to 
legibility as such at a particular time, that of its 
recognizability. 
 A situation, indeed. To be made to glimpse 
“what fixedly observes you not seeing that with 
which or with whom you are dealing”: I draw on 
the ignorance of others in order to have drawn, 
with my own ignorance, my own self-portrait. 
 
§ ON ARGUMENT: FRAGMENTS 
 
Alfred North Whitehead: “It is more important 
that a proposition be interesting than that it be 
true. The importance of truth,” he goes on to 
say, “is that it adds to interest.” 
 In 1735, with the first appearance of the 
Systema naturae, Linnaeus assigns Homo to the 
order of the Anthropomorpha. From the tenth 
edition of 1758 on, that order will be called 
Primates. “In truth, Linnaeus’ genius consists 
not so much in the resoluteness with which he 
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places man among the primates,” Giorgio 
Agamben has commented, 
as in the irony with which he does not 
record—as he does with the other 
species—any specific identifying charac-
teristic next to the generic name Homo, 
only the old philosophical adage: nosce te 
ipsum [know yourself]. Even in the tenth 
edition, when the complete denomina-
tion becomes Homo sapiens, all evidence 
suggests that the new epithet does not 
represent a description, but that it is only 
a simplification of the adage, which, 
moreover, maintains its position next to 
the term Homo. It is worth reflecting on 
this taxonomic anomaly, which assigns 
not a given, but rather an imperative as a 
specific difference. 
 An analysis of the Introitus that opens 
the Systema leaves no doubts about the 
sense Linnaeus attributed to his maxim: 
man has no specific identity other than 
the ability to recognize himself. Yet to de-
fine the human not through any nota 
characteristica, but rather through his 
self-knowledge, means that man is the 
being which recognizes itself as such, 
that man is the animal that must recognize 
itself as human to be human. 
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Amid the backlash, Agamben continues, “the 
notes for a reply to another critic, Theodor 
Klein, show how far Linnaeus was willing to 
push the irony implicit in the formula Homo 
sapiens. Those who, like Klein, do not recognize 
themselves in the position that the Systema has 
assigned to man should apply the nosce te ipsum 
to themselves; in not knowing how to recognize 
themselves as man, they have placed them-
selves among the apes.” 
 And yet it is significant that this reply is 
elaborated only in notes. On his own terms, and 
in principle, Linnaeus could not make that 
response. Homo is, again in Agamben’s words, 
“a constitutively ‘anthropomorphous’ animal”: 
Man only resembles man, and in order to recog-
nize himself for what he is, he must recognize 
himself as merely one among the Anthro-
pomorpha. Linnaeus could not make that res-
ponse to his critics, in other words, because he 
had staked his humanity on recognizing himself 
in them—in those, precisely, who are unable to. 
 Hume only became who he is because he 
managed to wake one philosopher from his 
dogmatic slumber. It’s entirely possible he may 
yet wake more. Should he do so it will be in no 
small part thanks to the work of Quentin 
Meillassoux: he has added his voice to Hume’s 
and revived the latter’s problem in all its 
radicality. Hume asks how we know the future 
will resemble the past, that is, that the usual 
connections observed between successive events are 
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necessary and, in fact, universal. The short an-
swer? We can’t. Hume’s treatment of the 
problem presaged its subsequent treatment from 
his time until today: because we believe in 
causal necessity on the basis of habit, induction 
has largely been treated as a practical problem, 
in other words, and for example, under what 
conditions and by what means are inductive in-
ferences generally made? In its ontological 
dimension the problem is taken to be insoluble 
because where it leads is taken to be absurd. 
Not so, Meillassoux: 
On the contrary, the ontological 
approach I speak of would consist in 
affirming that it is possible rationally to 
envisage that the constants could effec-
tively change for no reason whatsoever, 
and thus with no necessity whatsoever; 
which, as I will insist, leads us to envisage 
a contingency so radical that it would 
incorporate all conceivable futures of the 
present laws, including that consisting in 
the absence of their modification. 
Meillassoux continues, “I would affirm that, 
indeed, there is no reason for phenomenal 
constants to be constant. I maintain, then, that 
these laws could change. One thereby 
circumvents what, in induction, usually 
gives rise to the problem: the proof, on 
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the basis of past experience, of the future 
constancy of laws. But one encounters 
another difficulty, which appears at least 
as redoubtable: if laws have no reason to 
be constant, why do they not change at 
each and every instant? If a law is what it 
is purely contingently, it could change at 
any moment. The persistence of the laws 
of the universe seems consequently to 
break all laws of probability: for if the 
laws are effectively contingent, it seems 
that they must frequently manifest such 
contingency. If the duration of laws does 
not rest upon any necessity, it must be a 
function of successive ‘dice rolls’, falling 
each time in favour of their continuation 
[...]. From this point of view, their 
manifest perenniality becomes a prob-
abilistic aberration—and it is precisely 
because we never observe such modi-
fications that such a hypothesis has 
seemed, to those who tackled the 
problem of induction, too absurd to be 
seriously envisaged. 
 
If “the persistence of the laws of the universe 
seems consequently to break all laws of 
probability,” Meillassoux goes on to argue, 
that’s because probability doesn’t apply here. 
To the objection that the uniformity of nature 
would be tantamount to untold dice throws 
with the same result, Žižek has pointed out that 
14 WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 
that argument “relies on a possible totalization 
of possibilities/probabilities, with regard to 
which the uniformity is improbable: if there is 
no standard, nothing is more improbable than 
anything else.” And that is very precisely the 
case here: there can be no standard in principle 
because the universe, unlike a die or a coin, 
possesses no denumerable set of possible states, no 
delimitable set of inherent possibilities. That is to 
say, the universe is nontotalizable. And it may 
even be illegitimate for that reason to speak of 
‘the universe.’ Umberto Eco has discussed this 
point near the end of “The Power of Falsehood.” 
“Does the universe exist? Good question.” If the 
universe does not exist that’s because the fut-
ure does. 
 Argument is by nature a rearguard action. 
(Nietzsche: “—what have I to do with refu-
tations!—”; “I refute it thus”: and thus Dr. 
Johnson kicks the stone but misses Berkeley.) 
The emphasis—the interest—is elsewhere: as 
Deleuze and Guattari put it, lines of flight are 
primary. First you flee, and only in flight do you 
fashion a weapon. 
§ ADDENDUM: ON ARGUMENT
“Philosophy,” Quentin Meillassoux has stated, 
“is the invention of strange forms of argumen-
tation.” A curious claim, it is at the same time a 
profound intuition. What’s at stake for philo-
sophy in the changing forms of argumentation 
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employed in it, and according to what necessity 
does the recourse to invention impose itself 
there? 
 Alexander Nehamas has staged the divided 
desire that organizes Nietzsche’s work. Niet-
zsche “wants, on the one hand, to distinguish 
himself from Socrates and from the philo-
sophical tradition. One way in which he might 
have achieved this goal would have been 
 
to refrain from writing anything that 
might in any conceivable manner be con-
strued as philosophical—the only certain 
method of accomplishing this purpose 
being to refrain from writing altogether. 
But this is not, and cannot be, Niet-
zsche’s way. Refraining from writing, ass-
uming that this was something he had 
any choice about, would not simply have 
distinguished him from the tradition; it 
would have prevented him from being 
related to it in any way. But Nietzsche 
also wants, on the other hand, to criticize 
that tradition and to offer views of his 
own which, in their undogmatic manner, 
will compete with other views. Yet this 
procedure always involves the risk of 
falling back into the philosophical tra-
dition after all. We can think of philo-
sophy as a mirror in which those who 
belong to it are reflected, while those 
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who are not reflected are totally irrele-
vant to it. 
Argument, above all, and before any explicit 
contention, registers the effects of a depar-
ture—and that nowhere more so than in its 
form. Formal invention in argumentation obli-
quely describes, in philosophy, the limit that 
joins what is relevant to what is irrelevant to 
philosophy. Wanting, strangely, it will have 
broached it in reflection. 
§ UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS
Without question, philosophy is an activity. 
One “does” philosophy; one philosophizes. What 
remains an open question, however, is the char-
acter and status of that activity: What is it to 
philosophize? In other words, what does one do 
when one does philosophy? 
1. 
In Chapter XV, “The Value of Philosophy,” the 
concluding chapter of The Problems of Philo-
sophy, Bertrand Russell observes that, “Philo-
sophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at 
knowledge.” “But,” he immediately concedes, “it 
cannot be maintained that philosophy has had 
any great measure of success in its attempts to 
provide definite answers to its questions. If you 
ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a histor-
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ian, or any other man [sic throughout] of learn-
ing, what definite body of truths has been 
ascertained by his science, his answer will last 
 
as long as you are willing to listen. But if 
you put the same question to a philo-
sopher, he will, if he is candid, have to 
confess that his study has not achieved 
positive results such as have been 
achieved by other sciences. It is true that 
this is partly accounted for by the fact 
that, as soon as definite knowledge con-
cerning any subject becomes possible, 
this subject ceases to be called philo-
sophy, and becomes a separate science. 
The whole study of the heavens, which 
now belongs to astronomy, was once 
included in philosophy; Newton’s great 
work was called ‘the mathematical prin-
ciples of natural philosophy.’ Similarly, 
the study of the human mind, which was 
a part of philosophy, has now been sep-
arated from philosophy and has become 
the science of psychology. Thus, to a 
great extent, the uncertainty of philo-
sophy is more apparent than real: those 
questions which are already capable of 
definite answers are placed in the sci-
ences, while those only to which, at 
present, no definite answer can be given, 
remain to form the residue which is 
called philosophy. 
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2. 
What remains, at present, to form that “residue 
which is called philosophy”? Perhaps nothing 
more, nor less, finally, than what philosophy 
ever had. 
Eric Dietrich has claimed that philosophy 
does not progress, that it “is exactly the same 
today as it was 3000 years ago; indeed, as it was 
from the beginning. What it does do,” however, 
he goes on to contend, “is stay current”: 
Imagine that Aristotle, as he’s walking 
around the Lyceum, encounters a time-
warp and pops forward to today, on a 
well-known campus somewhere in some 
English-speaking country, with the abil-
ity to speak English, dressed in modern 
garb, and that he doesn’t become de-
ranged as a result of all this. Curious 
about the state of knowledge, he finds a 
physics lecture and sits in. What he hears 
shocks him. A feather and an iron ball fall 
at the same rate in a vacuum; being heav-
ier doesn’t mean falling faster, some-
thing he doesn’t understand. Aristotle 
along with the rest of the class is shown 
the experimental verification of this from 
the moon (from the moon?!?!?) performed 
by Commander David Scott of Apollo 15. 
The very same equations (equations?!?!?) 
that explain why an apple falls to the 
MICHAEL MUNRO 19 	  
	  
ground explain how the moon stays in 
orbit around Earth and how Earth stays 
in orbit around the sun (orbits?!?!?). He 
learns of quantum mechanics’ strange-
nesses. The more he hears, the more 
shocked he gets. Finally, he just faints 
away. He faints away again in cosmology 
class where he learns, for starters, that 
comets and meteors, and the Milky Way 
are not atmospheric phenomena, as he 
concluded. The Big Bang, relativity, the 
size of the universe, the number of 
galaxies, dark matter, and dark energy . . . 
are all too much for him. In biology class, 
he learns that a living thing’s potential, its 
matter, is not at all explanatory, as he 
thought, but instead learns of genetics 
and developmental biology. He also 
learns that his idea of spontaneous 
generation is just plain wrong—not even 
close to being correct. He learns of evo-
lution and the discovery that all of life on 
Earth is related. As the class continues, 
he again faints dead away. 
After he comes to, he soberly 
concludes that this modern world, this 
advanced time, has utterly surpassed his 
knowledge and the knowledge of his 
time. He feels dwarfed by our epistemic 
sophistication. Sadly, he trundles off to a 
philosophy class—a metaphysics class, as 
it turns out. Here he hears the professor 
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lecturing about essences, about being qua 
being, about the most general structures 
of our thinking about the world. He 
knows exactly what the professor is 
talking about. Aristotle raises his hand to 
discuss some errors the professor seems 
to have made, and some important dis-
tinctions that he has not drawn. As the 
discussion proceeds, the metaphysics professor 
is a bit taken aback but also delighted at 
this (older) student’s acumen and in-
sight. Then Aristotle goes to an ethics 
class, where he learns of the current 
importance of what is apparently called 
“virtue ethics.” He recognizes it im-
mediately, but again, the professor seems 
to have left out some crucial details and 
failed to see some deeper aspects of the 
view. Aristotle raises his hand. . .  
This story of Aristotle’s return to 
philosophy no doubt is somewhat plaus-
ible to the reader (excluding, probably, the 
time-travel part). Perhaps it is no more 
than that or just barely that. But this is 
all I need. 
3. 
Gilles Deleuze has developed a theory of the 
event, of what constitutes an event. In contrast 
to the classical conception according to which 
being is opposed to becoming as eternity is to 
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time, Deleuze opposes becoming to history: 
whereas becoming is classically identified with 
history, it is their difference, their noncoin-
cidence, that pertains to events. As Deleuze has 
it, “not exactly something that occurs, but 
something in that which occurs,” “the part that 
eludes its own actualization in everything that 
happens.” 
An activity that approximates inactivity, an 
event that to all appearances approaches a non-
occurrence, what one does when one does phil-
osophy is, against history, to become—“that is 
to say, acting counter to our time and thereby 
acting on our time and, let us hope, for a time 
to come.” 
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h  ON NOT KNOWING 
§ A DEFENSE OF THE UNKNOWABLE
1. 
From a commentary generalizing an argument 
against Kant’s thing-in-itself to include “any 
theory of an unknowable”: 
What is meant in philosophy by the 
unknowable is something which, apart 
from all accidental circumstances, is such 
that the constitution of our minds is 
radically incapable of knowing it, some-
thing which is totally outside any con-
ceivable human knowledge, some-thing 
from which we are completely cut off, not 
by distance or lack of instruments and 
the like, but by the nature of our mental 
processes. 
 If anything is unknowable, this means 
that it is absolutely unknowable. And if 
we have any knowledge of it, however 
slight, it is not unknowable. 
 Total ignorance of a thing involves 
total unawareness of it, and therefore it 
involves unawareness of our ignorance. 
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Let us straightaway concede it all. But in what 
then does this defense consist? What is there 
left to save? 
 
2. 
 
A first approach to the unknowable may be to 
take note of the suffix, -able: in English it de-
notes a capacity, an ability or capability—a po-
tentiality. But what is a capacity? How is one to 
conceive of its existence? And how does it sub-
sist in its exercise, its realization? 
 A clue can be found in an obscure passage of 
the De Anima: “To suffer is not a simple term,” 
Aristotle writes. Further, 
 
In one sense it is a certain destruction 
through the opposite principle, and in 
another sense it is the preservation [sōt-
ēria, salvation] of what is in potentiality 
by what is in actuality and what is similar 
to it. . . . For he who possesses science [in 
potentiality] becomes someone who con-
templates in actuality, and either this is 
not an alteration—since here there is the 
gift of the self to itself and to actuality 
[epidosiseis auto]—or this is an alteration 
of a different kind. 
 
“Contrary to the traditional idea of potentiality 
that is annulled in actuality,” Giorgio Agamben 
has commented, “here we are confronted with a 
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potentiality that conserves itself and saves 
itself in actuality. Here potentiality, so to speak, 
survives actuality”—and that by way of a “gift,” 
“the gift of the self to itself and to actuality”: At 
the limit, in the instant of passage, that gift is 
one and the same and potentiality is realized 
for what it is. 
 Despite tradition, Aristotle is in agreement 
with Spinoza when the latter maintains that 
there is no potentiality separate from actuality 
(as Aristotle had it, between them, either there 
is not an alteration, or it is an alteration of a 
different kind). Gilles Deleuze has provided the 
decisive clarification. “All potentia,” for Spinoza, 
“is act, active and actual. The identity of power 
and action is explained by the following: all 
power is inseparable from a capacity for being 
affected, and this capacity for being affected is 
constantly and necessarily filled by affections 
that realize it.” Potentiality adheres in actuality, 
capacity in its exercise, because it is as such 
ceaselessly active in it, affected by it without 
reprieve: Potentiality is actual in perpetually 
separating from itself the passage to actuality 
in order to preserve, with each instant, the 
jointure between them. 
3. 
But what of the prefix, un-? How might nega-
tion qualify a capacity? 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty speculates on this 
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point in his notes: 
 
To touch and to touch oneself (to touch 
oneself = touching-touched [touchant-
touché]). They do not coincide in the 
body: the touching is never exactly the 
touched. This does not mean that they 
coincide ‘in the mind’ or at the level of 
‘consciousness.’ There must be some-
thing other than the body for the junc-
tion to be made. It is made in the 
untouchable. That which belongs to the 
Other which I will never touch. But that 
which I will never touch, he too does not 
touch; no privilege of the self over the 
other here. It is therefore not conscious-
ness that is untouchable—‘consciousness’ 
would be something positive, and then 
there would be another beginning, there 
is another beginning, of the duality of the 
reflecting and the reflected, like that of 
the touching and the touched. The un-
touchable is not a touchable that happ-
ens to be inaccessible; the unconscious is 
not a representation that happens to be 
inaccessible. The negative here is not a 
positive that is elsewhere (something tran-
scendent). It is a true negative.  
 
Daniel Heller-Roazen has provided a beautiful 
commentary on this passage. It’s worth quoting 
at length: 
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This note can be read as a compressed 
effort to explain a single fact: that 
however intimately they may be joined in 
a tactile act committed by one body on 
itself, the touching and the touched ‘do 
not coincide.’ Even when I lay one hand 
upon the other, the touching member, in 
other words, ‘is never exactly the touch-
ed.’ A medium, no matter how subtle it 
may seem, must separate the two tactile 
terms, even as it grants them the element 
in which they may meet. 
 Merleau-Ponty names this medium 
‘the untouchable.’ Irreducible both to the 
felt body and to the mind, conscious or 
unconscious, it constitutes the indistinct 
terrain in which the junction between the 
touching and the touched comes to pass. 
As Merleau-Ponty defines it in his note, 
such an ‘untouchable’ is, quite clearly, 
withdrawn from tactility not accidentally 
but essentially. ‘It is not a touchable that 
happens to be inaccessible,’ the philoso-
pher therefore specifies with pedagogical 
precision. It is ‘not a positive that is else-
where (something transcendent)’ but ‘a 
true negative.’ There can be no doubt: the 
untouchable, for this reason, retreats 
from the field of touch in allowing it. But 
such a summary nevertheless runs the 
risk of philosophical inadequacy, for the 
nature of the untouchable medium of 
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touch is in fact still more complex. The 
truth of the matter is that every touching 
and touched term solicits and encounters 
this element, precisely as that ‘in which’ 
all contact comes to pass; every grasp, be 
it forceful or gentle, exerts itself upon it 
and within it. Despite its structural 
inaccessibility, the medium of touch is 
therefore not impassive; in Merleau-
Ponty’s words, it is not ‘something tran-
scendent.’ One might even maintain that, 
since no contact is immediate and ‘the 
touching is never exactly the touched,’ 
one never truly encounters anything but 
it. The ultimate element of all touch, it 
remains no less untouchable for being 
incessantly, always, and already touched. 
 
A true negative, the capacity at issue in the 
untouchable and the unknowable alike finds its 
exercise in the non-coincidence between touch-
ing and touched, knowing and known: The 
excess of capacity in act, a solicitation and an 
encounter, it is the contact of the two terms at 
a remove. 
 
4. 
 
As to the root word to know, the unknowable is 
preserved in it to the extent that it is not 
known—it remains unclear whether it can be 
known—what it is, in principle, to know. 
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 The unknowable is the gift of knowability. In 
that gift it is saved. 
§ ON NOT KNOWING
What moves me to write this is a perplexity. In 
order to effectively communicate that perplex-
ity, free of confusion, let me attempt to delin-
eate it by way of an example. 
TWO WAYS OF NOT KNOWING? 
Perhaps not any example, its classic formu-
lation is to be found in Plato’s Meno (80d-e): 
Socrates: […] So now I do not know what 
virtue is; perhaps you knew before you 
contacted me, but now you are certainly 
like one who does not know. Never-
theless, I want to examine and seek toge-
ther with you what it may be. 
Meno: How will you look for it, Socrates, 
when you do not know at all what it is? 
How will you aim to search for something 
you do not know at all? If you should 
meet with it, how will you know that this 
is the thing that you did not know? 
Socrates: I know what you want to say, 
Meno. Do you realize what a debater’s 
argument you are bringing up, that a 
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man cannot search either for what he 
knows or for what he does not know? He 
cannot search for what he knows—since 
he knows it, there is no need to search—
nor for what he does not know, for he 
does not know what to search for. 
 
Is there a way for one not to know that is not 
simply not knowing? What would it be to be-
come capable of it? 
 Taken to its extreme, what is at issue here is 
nothing less than the Socratic enterprise: How 
could Socrates know, as he puts it, that he 
knows nothing? What is that knowledge such 
that, for him, it instigates a “search” that is in 
every respect unprecedented? What, in light of 
that search, is the “nothing” that he knows? 
 
IN PLACE OF CONCLUSION 
 
What is an absence? If a given absence can be 
determined to be relevant to that to which it is 
nonetheless said to be absent, is it fair to 
maintain that it is in fact absent to it? And 
conversely, if an absence does not bear on 
anything, how can it be an absence? 
 Kant distinguishes between threshold (Grenze) 
and limit (Schranke). A threshold marks a pass-
age, a delimitation that serves to join to some-
thing an outside that alters it, while a limit 
operates on that which it bounds by remaining, 
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with respect to it, invisible. A limit never app-
ears as such. 
 Of what relevance is perplexity? It is perhaps 
in this instance the sounding of a limit. 
§ FOR THE LOVE OF WISDOM: NOTE
It’s clear that “philosophy” comes from the 
Greek philosophia, love of wisdom. What’s not at 
all clear is what that phrase means. In the 
connection it articulates between love and wis-
dom, what, precisely, does philosophy name? 
 In Chapter 4 of The Open, “Mysterium disiun-
ctionis,” Giorgio Agamben has discussed the 
manner in which, in the De anima, Aristotle 
defines “life”: 
It is through life [Aristotle writes] that 
what has soul in it differs from what has 
not. Now this term ‘to live’ has more 
than one sense, and provided any one of 
these is found in a thing we say that the 
thing is living—viz. thinking, sensation, 
local movement and rest, or movement in 
the sense of nutrition, decay and growth. 
Hence we think of all species of plants 
also as living, for they are observed to 
possess in themselves a principle and 
potentiality through which they grow 
and decay in opposite directions. . . . This 
principle can be separated from the others, but 
not they from it—in mortal beings at least. 
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The fact is obvious in plants; for it is the only 
psychic potentiality they possess. Thus, it is 
through this principle that life belongs to 
living things. . . . By nutritive power we 
mean that part of the soul which is com-
mon also to plants. 
 It is important to observe that 
Aristotle in no way defines what life is: 
he limits himself to breaking it down, by 
isolating the nutritive function, in order 
then to rearticulate it in a series of 
distinct and correlated faculties or poten-
tialities (nutrition, sensation, thought). 
Here we see at work the principle of 
foundation which constitutes the strat-
egic device par excellence of Aristotle’s 
thought. It consists in reformulating every 
question concerning ‘what something is’ as 
a question concerning ‘through what 
something belongs to another thing.’ To 
ask why a certain being is called living 
means to seek out the foundation by 
which living belongs to this being. That is 
to say, among the various senses of the 
term ‘to live,’ one must be separated 
from the others and settle to the bottom, 
becoming the principle by which life can 
be attributed to a certain being. In other 
words, what has been separated and 
divided (in this case nutritive life) is 
precisely what—in a sort of divide et 
imperia—allows the unity of life as the 
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hierarchical articulation of a series of 
functional faculties and oppositions. 
To paraphrase part of the analysis with which 
Agamben closes the chapter: What would it be 
to think philosophy not as the conjunction of 
love with wisdom but rather, following Aris-
totle’s procedure, “as what results from the in-
congruity of these two elements”? 
 Is it permissible to speculate that philosophy 
may name a like disjunction, similarly mys-
terious? 
 What wisdom would there be in that? What 
love would it betray? 
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WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 
 
Pg. 1: What is philosophy?  Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? trans. 
Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 41: 
“The nonphilosophical is perhaps closer to the 
heart of philosophy than philosophy itself, and 
this means that philosophy cannot be content 
to be understood only philosophically or con-
ceptually, but is addressed essentially to non-
philosophers as well.”  
 
Pg. 2: Definition, for Spinoza, gets at the 
essence  Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Treatise on the 
Emendation of the Intellect, and Selected Letters, 
ed. Seymour Feldman, trans. Samuel Shirley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 1992), 257–59, pars. 95–97. 
 
Pg. 2: as one commentator has pointed out  
Seymour Feldman, Introduction to Baruch Spinoza, 
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Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, in Ethics, 
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, and 
Selected Letters, ed. Feldman, 229. 
Pg. 2: What Auden said of poetry  W.H. 
Auden, Collected Poems: Auden, ed. Edward Men-
delson (New York: Vintage, 1991), 246: “For 
poetry makes nothing happen: it survives / In 
the valley of its making […] it survives, / A way 
of happening, a mouth.” 
Pg. 2: it makes nothing happen  
SUSPENSE: NOTE ON TOPOGRAPHY 
The refutation of utopia, in politics as in philo-
sophy, has proven no more definitive than has 
its invocation. That it remains an issue, 
however, affords a better understanding of it: 
its mode of persistence gives insight into its 
nature.  
 As Giorgio Agamben has recounted, a 
technical term of the Skeptics’ stakes out a no 
man’s land between affirmation and negation, 
acceptance and rejection: ou mallon, no more 
than. It is by way of this phrase that the 
Skeptics denote—and enact—what Agamben 
calls “their most characteristic experience,” that 
of epochē, suspension: It is used by them to 
refute an argument at the same time as the 
counterargument on offer. “‘No more than,’” 
records Diogenes Laertius, “is no more than it is 
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not.”  Sextus Empiricus concurs. “Even as the 
proposition ‘every discourse is false’ says that it 
too, like all propositions, is false, so the formula 
‘no more than’ says that it itself is no more than 
it is not.” 
 Utopia exists no more than it does not exist. 
It has become a commonplace to point out that 
the word “utopia” originally designated “nowhere.” 
But it is necessary to add what Gilles Deleuze 
observes of the title of Samuel Butler’s utopian 
novel Erewhon: It is “not only a disguised no-
where but a rearranged now-here.” The rever-
sibility of no-where and now-here—by way of a 
single, finally unlocatable space—makes of uto-
pia the most common place. Giorgio Agamben, 
Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. 
and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 256; Gilles 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul 
Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994), 333n7. 
	  
Pg. 2: In its deepest intention, philosophy 
is  Agamben, Potentialities, 249. 
 
Pg. 4: the construction of In a recent 
interview Quentin Meillassoux has differenti-
ated two senses of the word ‘construction’: “If I 
employ this word in connection with the work 
of an architect, 
 
what I mean is that the building thereby 
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constructed would not have existed with-
out the architect’s plan or the labour of 
the workers. But let’s suppose that by 
‘construction’ I refer instead to the 
mechanisms by which an archeologist has 
set up a dig site in order to excavate some 
ruins without damaging them. In this 
case the ‘constructions’ (a complex of 
winches, sounding lines, scaffolding, spades, 
brushes, etc.) are not destined to produce 
an object, as in the case of architecture. 
On the contrary, they are made with a 
view to not interfering with the object at 
which they aim: that is to say, excavating 
the ruins without damaging them. 
Included in Graham Harman, Quentin Meilla-
ssoux: Philosophy in the Making (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 167. 
Pg. 5: As Giorgio Agamben recounts 
Agamben has recounted Aristotle’s definition of 
potentiality many times, prominent among 
them in “On Potentiality,” in Potentialities, 
177–84, and in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 44–47. 
“I could state the subject of my work,” Agamben 
writes near the beginning of the former, “as an 
attempt to understand the meaning of the verb 
‘can’ [potere]. What do I mean when I say: ‘I can, 
I cannot?’” (“On Potentiality,” 177). In a paren-
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thetical interjection among his opening re-
marks in The Neutral, Roland Barthes proposes 
an interesting complication of that question 
when he writes, “(Who can distinguish be-
tween inability and the lack of taste?)” Roland 
Barthes, The Neutral, trans. Rosalind E. Krauss 
and Denis Hollier (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2005), 10. Stated positively, how 
is taste implicated in ability? And what would it 
say of one’s own ability, not to mention taste, 
going forward, to attempt to tease them apart? 
 
ON ARGUMENT 
 
Pg. 7 ON ARGUMENT   
 
APOLOGIA PRO VITA PHILOSOPHICUS, APOLOGIA 
PRO VITA SUA 
  
In “Philosophy and Disagreement,” Brian Rib-
eiro takes as his point of departure the ques-
tion, “Why,” in philosophy, “is there all this dis-
agreement?”: 
 
Philosophy is not only rife with dis-
agreement; one might even say that philo-
sophy is in the business of disagreement. 
That’s who we are, or what we do, qua 
philosophers: we question, dispute, object, 
oppose, beg to differ, quibble, and some-
times even cavil. Since this is so, one might 
expect philosophy would, long ago, have 
40 WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 
worked out a fairly sophisticated account of 
disagreement—of its nature, origin(s), and 
its implications for the practice of philo-
sophy—but it seems fairly clear to me that 
this is not so. 
 I find that very surprising. After all, one 
of the other things philosophy is in the 
business of is being a thoroughly and un-
compromisingly self-critical enterprise, i.e. 
being an enterprise that not only thinks 
about its paradigmatic objects of inquiry but 
also thinks about itself and its relation to its 
own inquiries. Thus, one might be surprised 
to find that philosophy is in the business of 
doing (at least) two things (viz. disputing 
and being relentlessly self-critical), but 
doesn’t appear to be in the business of doing 
them in conjunction (being relentlessly self-
critical about this disputing.) 
Ribeiro goes on to claim that this is a 
“problem.” A curious problem, indeed: What is 
the relationship between philosophy and dis-
agreement? 
 Daniel Heller-Roazen has provided an 
account of what it is, following the Stoic per-
cept, to live according to nature. He notes a 
distinction that “may seem subtle, but it is, in 
truth, of prime importance, as the thinkers of 
Antiquity well knew.” Further, 
A text of uncertain authorship contained 
REFERENCES 41 	  
	  
in the De anima liber cum mantissa attri-
buted to Alexander of Aphrodisias most 
clearly illustrates the point. The perti-
nent passage consists of two sentences, 
the first of which attributes a doctrine to 
some Stoics, “but not all of them”: the 
belief, namely, that “that which the ani-
mal senses as the first thing that belongs 
[to prōton oikeion] is nothing other than 
itself.” The second sentence continues: 
“Others, instead, seeking to give a more 
elegant and precise definition, say that 
from the moment of birth we are 
appropriated to our constitution and to 
that which preserves it [phasin pros tēn 
sustasin kai tērēsin ōikeiōsthai euthus 
genomenous hēmas tēn hēmōn autōn].” 
 The contrast between the two state-
ments could not be more clear. It sets a 
formulation of some imprecision against 
the principle repeatedly espoused by 
Seneca and the masters of the Stoic 
school. The ‘more elegant and precise 
definition’ posits, at the heart of every 
being, a difference without which it could 
not come to be itself: the difference 
between the self and its constitution, 
that most proper thing to which the 
animal, in relating itself to the world 
about it, comes by nature to be appro-
priated. Not the self but that to which 
the self perceives itself to be assigned 
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and to which it must always adapt itself, 
the ‘constitution’ is that element within 
the animal with which it never altogether 
coincides, to which, from birth, it con-
tinues to ‘conciliate’ and ‘commend’ it-
self. It is that for which every living 
thing, to be and to preserve itself, must 
‘care,’ that which each being, rational or 
not, incessantly senses and never knows. 
Disagreement in philosophy follows from ‘the 
difference,’ in each philosopher, ‘between the 
self and its constitution’: That ‘to which the self 
perceives itself to be assigned and to which it 
must always adapt itself,’ what a philosopher 
must ‘conciliate’ him- or herself to before all 
else, and with every word, is the assignation of 
that self to inquiry. Mutually delivered over one 
to the other, mutually inexplicable one in terms 
of the other, everything in philosophy trans-
pires between a self and the rigors of its in-
quiries. Investigation in its course, a kind of 
propitiation, is what comes to make one’s 
inquiries, as it does one’s life, as a philosopher, 
one’s own. Informing every unaccountable de-
parture, it is also that according to which 
philosophy lives. Brian Ribeiro, “Philosophy and 
Disagreement,” Crítica 43 (2011): 3–4; Daniel 
Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a 
Sensation (Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books, 
2007), 114–15.  
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Pg. 7: an Art of Ignorance  Giorgio Agamben, 
“The Last Chapter in the History of the World,” 
in Nudities, trans. David Kishik and Stefan 
Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2011), 113–14. 
 
Pg. 7: It is very difficult to say  Deleuze, 
Difference and Repetition, xv. See also, at 162: 
“Problems are tests and selections.” 
 
Pg. 7: In the perusal of philosophical works  
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 
ed. Nigel Leask (New York: Everyman 
Paperbacks, 1997), 141. 
 
Pg. 7: the status of the self-portrait  
Jacques Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-
Portrait and Other Ruins, trans. Pascale-Anne 
Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), 64. 
 
Pg. 7: Even if one were sure Derrida, Memoirs 
of the Blind, 65. 
 
Pg. 8: the inscription of the inscribable  
Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind, 45. 
 
Pg. 9: an historical index  Walter Benjamin, 
The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and 
Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 462–63. See 463 for 
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“the perilous critical moment on which all 
reading is founded.” 
Pg. 9: It is more important that Alfred 
North Whitehead, Process and Reality, ed. David 
Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New 
York: The Free Press, 1978), 259. 
Pg. 9: the Systema naturae, Linnaeus 
assigns  Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and 
Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 24. 
Pg. 9: In truth, Linneaus’ genius consists  
Agamben, The Open, 25. 
Pg. 11: the notes for a reply  Agamben, The 
Open, 26. 
Pg. 11: a constitutively ‘anthropomor-
phous’ animal  Agamben, The Open, 27. 
Pg. 11: Hume only became who he is  Walter 
Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 
278: “It would seem that the British discovered 
Hume’s philosophical significance by way of 
Kant and Hegel.” And higher up on the same 
page: “Berkeley and Hume had been promi-
nently mentioned by Kant and could not be 
ignored. Through Kant they gained a place in 
the tradition.” 
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Pg. 11: Hume asks how we know  Quentin 
Meillassoux, “Potentiality and Virtuality,” 
trans. Robin Mackay, in The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi 
Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman 
(Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 224–36. 
 
Pg. 12: On the contrary, the ontological 
approach Meillassoux, “Potentiality and Vir-
tuality,” 226. See also, Quentin Meillassoux, 
After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Con-
tinuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 
84: “We all know the old adage according to 
which there is no absurdity that has not at one 
time or another been seriously defended by 
some philosopher. Our objector might acerb-
ically remark that we have just proved this 
adage false, for there was one absurdity no one 
had yet proclaimed, and we have just unearthed 
it.” 
 
Pg. 12: I would affirm that, indeed  
Meillassoux, “Potentiality and Virtuality,” 227. 
 
Pg. 13: Žižek has pointed out  Slavoj Žižek, 
“Is it Still Possible to be a Hegelian Today?” in 
The Speculative Turn, eds. Bryant, Srnicek, and 
Harman, 216. 
 
Pg. 14: Umberto Eco has discussed this 
point  Umberto Eco, “The Power of Falsehood,” 
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in On Literature, trans. Martin McLaughlin 
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 2004), 272–301. 
See also, 300: “The idea of the universe as the 
totality of the cosmos is an idea 
that comes from the most ancient 
cosmographies, cosmologies, and cos-
mogonies. But can we possibly describe, 
as if we could see it from above, some-
thing inside which we are con-tained, of 
which we form a part, and which we can-
not leave? Can we provide a descriptive 
geometry of the universe when there is 
no space outside it onto which to project 
it? Can we speak of the beginning of the 
universe when a temporal notion like 
that of a beginning must refer to the 
parameters of a clock whereas at most 
the universe is its own clock and cannot 
be referred to anything that is external to 
it? Can we say with Eddington that 
‘hundreds of thousands of stars make up 
a galaxy; hundreds of thousands of 
galaxies make up the universe,’ when, as 
[Jean-François] Gautier observes [in 
L’Univers existe-t-il?], although a galaxy is 
an object that can be observed, the uni-
verse is not, and therefore one is estab-
lishing an unwarranted analogy between 
two incommensurate entities? 
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Pg. 14: —what have I to do with 
refutations!— Friedrich Nietzsche, On the 
Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, ed. Walter 
Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), 
18. 
 
Pg. 14: as Deleuze and Guattari put it  
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), 531: Lines of flight are 
“primary,” they “are not phenomena of resis-
tance or counterattack in an assemblage, but 
cutting edges of creation and deterritorial-
ization.”  
 
Pg. 14: First you flee  George Jackson, Soledad 
Brother: The Prison Letters of George Jackson 
(Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1994), 328: “I 
may run, but all the time that I am, I’ll be 
looking for a stick!” 
 
Pg. 14: Philosophy is the invention  
Meillassoux, After Finitude, 76. 
 
Pg. 15: Alexander Nehamas has staged  
Alexander Nehemas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1985), 34. 
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Pg. 16: Philosophy, like all other studies  
Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 
154–155. 
Pg. 18: is exactly the same today Eric 
Dietrich, “There is No Progress in Philosophy,” 
Essays in Philosophy 12:2 (2011): 332. 
Pg. 18: Imagine that Aristotle Dietrich, 
“There is No Progress in Philosophy,” 334. 
Pg. 21: not exactly something that occurs  
Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Con-
stantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester with 
Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990), 149 (my emphasis). 
Pg. 21: the part that eludes  Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. 
Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 156. 
111: “To think is to experiment, 
but experimentation is always that which is 
in the process of coming about—the new, 
remarkable, and interesting that replace the 
appearance of truth and are more demand-
ing than it is. What is in the process of com-
ing about is no more what ends than what 
begins. History is not experimentation, it is 
only the set of almost negative conditions 
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that make possible the experimentation of 
something that escapes history. Without 
history experimentation would remain indeter-
minate and unconditioned, but experimen-
tation is not historical. It is philosophical. 	  
Pg. 22: that is to say, acting counter  
Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ed. 
Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 60. 
Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 80, 76: “The sup-
remacy of fact over thought means that even 
the utmost flight of speculative thought should 
have its measure of truth”: “Abstract specu-
lation has been the salvation of the world—
speculation which made systems and then 
transcended them, speculations which ventured 
to the furthest limit of abstraction. To set limits 
to speculation is treason to the future.” 
 
ON NOT KNOWING 
 
Pg. 22: What is meant in philosophy by the 
unknowable W.T. Stace, The Philosophy of Heg-
el: A Systematic Exposition (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1955), 46. 
 
Pg. 22: If anything is unknowable  Stace, 
The Philosophy of Hegel, 47. 
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Pg. 22: Total ignorance of a thing  Stace, The 
Philosophy of Hegel, 47. 
Pg. 23: an obscure passage of the De Anima  
Agamben, “On Potentiality,” 184. Agamben 
claims of this passage, on the same page, “that 
it is truly one of the vertices of Aristotle’s 
thought and that [it] fully authorizes the 
medieval image of a mystical Aristotle.” 
Pg. 24: All potentia, for Spinoza  Gilles 
Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. 
Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1988), 97. 
Pg. 24: Potentiality is actual in perpetually 
separating from itself  Gilles Deleuze, The 
Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles 
Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990), 151–52: “On 
one side, there is the part of the event which is 
realized and accomplished; on the other, there 
is that ‘part of the event which cannot realize 
its accomplishment.’ There are thus two acc-
omplishments, which are like actualization, and 
counter-actualization.” 
Pg. 24: Maurice Merleau-Ponty speculates  
Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch, 295–96. 
Pg. 25: Heller-Roazen has provided a 
beautiful commentary Heller-Roazen, The 
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Inner Touch, 296. 
 
Pg. 28: found in Plato’s Meno  Plato, Five 
Dialogues, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1981), 69. 
 
Pg. 28: the Socratic enterprise See Alex-
ander Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic 
Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000). See also 
Brian Satterfield, “What is the Good of the 
‘Examined Life’? Some Thoughts on the Apology 
and Liberal Education,” Expositions 3.2 (2009): 
183–84: 
 
[T]o say that the reason for examining 
one’s life is not to misspend it is to miss 
the more problematic dimension of 
Socrates’ claim; it is to transform Socra-
tes’ practice into an essentially utilitarian 
activity, good because of its possible ben-
efits or outcomes. It is to trivialize Socra-
tic philosophy by turning it into a species 
of self-help. Having reflected and come to 
better views of what one ought to aim at, 
it implies, we should set aside reflection 
and examination, and go on with leading 
our new, more meaningful lives. So seen, 
reflection may be a necessary prelim-
inary—especially in corrupt places and 
times—but it is ultimately only a pre-
paration for life, not life itself. 
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 Socrates’ own words are more chall-
enging, and for two reasons. The first is 
that thinking things over seems to be, for 
Socrates, not a means to an end, but an 
end itself. It is, he says—astonishingly—
not the practice of virtue that is the 
greatest good for a human being, but 
talking about virtue in the course of every 
day. This proposition is only defensible, I 
suggest, if talking about virtue is virtue. 
Virtue, Socrates seems to be suggesting, 
is necessarily actively self-reflective, the 
eye seeing itself seeing. Something about 
this tends to stick in the craw of 
students. For not only do many of them 
not see themselves as especially inter-
ested in thinking, but the demands that 
Socrates seems to place on them—that 
they suspend concerns for advancement, 
family, and personal lives while they 
enter upon a course of questioning that 
will ultimately prove inconclusive—seem 
extreme, even perverse. The natural ten-
dency is to dismiss by becoming ‘reason-
able,’ temporizing. Sure, some reflection 
is good; but Socrates takes it too far. 
‘Shouldn’t he be supporting his children?’ 
is a common question. 
 Reinforcing this objection is a second: 
if Socrates himself is a model of the kind 
of examination that he urges on others, 
his lifetime of inquiry appears remark-
REFERENCES 53 	  
	  
ably unsuccessful. Having constantly 
engaged in discussions about virtue, he 
seems by the time of his trial to have 
learned nothing. All he has achieved, on 
his own account, is knowledge of his ig-
norance. The prospect of spending one’s 
life in unpleasant (as students think) and 
fruitless inquiry—inquiry which does not 
even pretend to hold out the possibility 
of answers—is disheartening. And some, 
understandably enough, lose interest as 
soon as it becomes clear that there is no 
concrete prize or reward at the end. The 
natural question of the student—‘what 
am I going to get out of this?’—has no 
answer that the soul disposed to ask it in 
the first place is going to recognize as 
satisfactory; reflection and self-know-
ledge are not products, but processes, or 
rather activities. One does not, in think-
ing about Socratic questions, typically get 
a final answer; one gets—at best—
understanding of possibilities. 
 
Pg. 29: Kant distinguishes between  
Agamben, “On Potentiality,” 214. See also A 
761 / B 789 in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996), 703. 
 
Pg. 30: Agamben has discussed the manner  
Agamben, The Open, 13–14. 
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Pg. 32: as what results from the in-
congruity  Agamben, The Open, 16. 
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W. dreams, like Phaedrus, of an army of 
thinker-friends, thinker-lovers. He dreams 
of a thought-army, a thought-pack, which 
would storm the philosophical Houses of 
Parliament.He dreams of Tartars from the 
philosophical steppes, of thought-
barbarians, thought-outsiders. What 
distances would shine in their eyes! 
~Lars Iyer 
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